Database Search Result Details
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First Name
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Mary
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Last Name
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Durstein
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Decision Date
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9/22/2017
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Docket Number
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2017-1955-CabED
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ALJ
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WBM
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Respondent
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Cabell County Board of Education
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Employment Type
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PROF
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Job Title
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Teacher
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Topics
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Termination; Dismissal
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Primary Issues
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Whether Respondent had good cause to terminate Grievant for activity on her own public social media account.
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Outcome
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Denied
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Statutes
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W. Va. Code § 18A-2-8; W. Va. Code § 6C 2 2 (d)
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Related Cases
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Woo v. Putnam County Bd. of Educ., 202 W. Va. 409, 413 (W. Va. June 24, 1998); Conner v. Barbour County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 94-01-394 (Jan. 31, 1995); Domingues v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 04-10-341 (Jan. 28, 2005); Frymier v. Higher Educ. Policy Comm’n, 655 S.E.2d 52, 221 W. Va. 306 (2007); Alderman v. Pocahontas County Bd. of Educ., 223 W. Va. 431; 675 S.E.2d 907 (2009); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505U.S. 377 (1992); Yerrid v. Div. of Highways, Docket No. 2009-1692-DOT (Mar. 26, 2010); Shores v. W. Va. Parkways Econ. Dev. & Tourism Auth., Docket No. 2009-1583-DOT (Dec. 1, 2009); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1959, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006)
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Keywords
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Termination; Discrimination; First Amendment; Freedom of Speech; Social Media; Rational Nexus; Job Duties; Code of Conduct
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Intermediate Court of Appeals
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Circuit Court
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Supreme Court
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Synopsis
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Grievant, a social studies teacher, made several provocative posts on her public Twitter account which became the subject of significant notoriety when they were exposed by other Twitter users. Respondent determined that due to the nature of the posts, as well as their notoriety, it was not possible for Grievant to continue as an effective social studies teacher and terminated her employment.
Grievant argued that Respondent contributed to the notoriety of her Twitter posts, that here was no rational nexus between the posts and Grievant’s job duties, that the other employees were given less discipline for similar offenses and that Respondent was barred from dismissing Grievant because her posts were protected by the First Amendment.
Respondent proved there was a rational nexus between Grievant’s conduct away from work and her job duties, and that there was significant “untainted notoriety to support Grievant’s dismissal. Additionally, Grievant was not similarly situated with the other employees she cited to prove discrimination. Respondent proved that the Grievant’s activity was not entitled to free speech protections, and the employers interests in creating a safe, healthy, and unbiased learning environment outweighed Grievant’s free speech interests.
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